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SIB-02

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SIB-02 is an ABB safety interface board that supervises emergency-stop, run, brake, cabin-interlock, and high-voltage-interlock paths in an IRC5 robot controller.
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Ships by Saturday, November 14
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Technical specifications for SIB-02

  • Manufacturer:
    ABB
  • Part Number:
    SIB-02
  • Product Family:
    ABB Robots
  • Product Type:
    Safety Interface Board
  • Stock:
    1
  • Safety relays:
    KA16 and KA17
  • Board communication:
    Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)
  • Connected boards:
    Process Interface Board (PIB); Manipulator Interface Board (MIB)
  • Monitored safety chains:
    Emergency stop; run; brake
  • Paint interlocks:
    Cabin interlock; high-voltage interlock
  • Fault response:
    SYS HALT or paint-enable-chain opening, according to the affected chain
  • Tariff Code:
    Please confirm the destination before shipping
  • Country of origin:
    Sweden
  • Place of shipment:
    Xiamen,Fujian,China
By purchasing this item, you agree to the Terms & Conditions, ApterPower is not an authorized distributor for listed manufacturers or tradenames and therefore the manufacturer's warranty does not apply. All our products come with ApterPower's 1-year warranty.

More Information

Overview Manuals SPI Diagnostics Chain Response Fault Isolation Product Applications

Features:

  • Hardware safety chain: KA16 and KA17 participate in the controller motor-on path
  • Dual-board supervision: SIB and MIB compare run and brake feedback chains
  • Paint-cell interlocks: cabin and high-voltage conflicts affect the paint-enable path
SIB-02 supervises multiple hardware safety paths within the IRC5 controller instead of operating as a general-purpose interface card.

Its engineering value lies in coordinated feedback: the controller compares safety-chain states across the installed board set and reacts according to the affected chain.

Service records should connect the full board label, reported chain, PIB and MIB context, cable state, and completed machine-safety validation.
Apter Power can review SIB-02 controller context, safety-chain evidence, condition, and sourcing requirements.
ABB SIB-02 Safety Interface Board Manuals, Datasheets, Links
Important Notice: Other accessories, manuals, cables, calibration data, software, etc. are not included with this equipment unless listed in the above stock item description. All prices are shown in USD.
  • Cyclic enable test: the controller supervises the safety path through repeated SPI communication checks.
  • Watchdog boundary: internal SPI watchdog events distinguish communication loss from a field interlock.
  • Board path: inspect the PIB-to-SIB and SIB-to-MIB connections named by the reported event.
  • Run or brake conflict: divergent chain feedback can place the controller in SYS HALT.
  • Cabin or HV conflict: a paint-interlock mismatch can open the paint-enable chain.
  • Supply feedback: missing fail-safe or emergency-stop supply feedback must be traced before board exchange.
  • Event-led diagnosis: begin with the specific run, brake, emergency-stop, cabin, or high-voltage chain reported by IRC5.
  • Two-board comparison: preserve evidence from both SIB and MIB rather than replacing one board on appearance alone.
  • Return to service: validate the complete safety function after the communication and field paths are restored.
  • IRC5 safety supervision: monitor the controller hardware chains used for motor-on permission.
  • Paint-cell interlocking: supervise cabin and high-voltage interlock feedback in supported installations.
  • Chain-specific troubleshooting: separate SPI communication, board feedback, and field-circuit faults.
Description
SIB-02 is the ABB safety interface board used in the IRC5 hardware safety chain. Its relays and feedback paths participate in motor-on permission while the board supervises emergency-stop, run, brake, cabin-interlock, and high-voltage-interlock states.

Within the controller, SIB-02 works with the Process Interface Board and Manipulator Interface Board so that safety-chain feedback can be compared rather than accepted from a single point. This architecture helps IRC5 distinguish communication faults from interlock or chain divergence.

When servicing SIB-02, identify the exact chain named by the controller event, retain the installed PIB and MIB context, and preserve cable and board records. Return to operation only after the affected safety function has been validated through the approved machine procedure.
Alternative Names
ABB SIB02 safety board SIB 02 robot safety interface ABB safety interface PCB SIB02 robot safety board SIB 02
Technical notes
SIB-02 communicates with the Process Interface Board and Manipulator Interface Board through the controller SPI safety path. Loss of cyclic enable communication or divergent run and brake feedback can place IRC5 in SYS HALT. Diagnose the reported chain before replacement; board power alone does not demonstrate a healthy safety path.
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FAQS

The following is a list of questions commonly asked by our customers. Please contact us if you have a question about our process that is not answered below.
Why can IRC5 reject a motor-on command when SIB-02 appears powered?
The hardware safety path also depends on relays KA16 and KA17 and valid chain feedback. Trace the controller event, relay state, board connections, and field interlocks before treating visible power as proof of a complete motor-on path.
What does a run-chain conflict reported through SIB-02 mean for troubleshooting?
IRC5 has detected disagreement in the monitored run feedback rather than a generic board-power failure. Compare the two run-chain states, related MIB feedback, wiring, connectors, and event history before deciding whether the board or field circuit is responsible.
How should a cabin-interlock conflict involving SIB-02 be handled in a paint installation?
Treat it as a paint-enable-path problem. Inspect the cabin interlock device, both feedback paths, the SIB and MIB connections, and the event sequence; the controller can open paint enable when the two chains do not agree.
Which communication path should be checked after an SPI fault names SIB-02?
Follow the controller event through the PIB-to-SIB and SIB-to-MIB links, checking connectors, cable condition, cyclic-enable communication, and related watchdog events. Do not replace the board until the failed segment has been isolated.
Why should emergency-stop supply feedback be verified before replacing SIB-02?
The board reports the emergency-stop and fail-safe 24 V supply paths to IRC5. A missing supply, damaged cable, or connector fault can therefore produce a safety shutdown that board replacement alone will not correct.
What evidence should accompany an urgent SIB-02 sourcing request?
Provide readable board and controller labels, the IRC5 robot identity, the exact safety-chain event, PIB and MIB context, connector photographs, condition, quantity, destination, and the planned validation window. This lets the quotation follow the installed safety architecture.